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I argue that musical experience has little to
do with understanding or imagining emo-
tion. I draw on experimental work done by
Rory Allen and his colleagues on musical
experience and autism.
AUTISM
In order to pursue the argument, we need
some general and relatively uncontrover-
sial claims about autism and emotion. For
brevity, by people with “autism,” I will
mean people with what is termed “autism
spectrum disorder”—which encompasses
a variety and a range of different con-
ditions, but which all involve a defi-
ciency in thinking about other minds.
Two decades ago there was a consensus
that the explanation was that those with
autism were to some extent “mind-blind”;
that is, those with autism exhibit a rela-
tive lack of understanding of other minds
when compared with typically developing
people (Baron-Cohen, 1995). But this is
not so widely accepted now. Other possi-
ble explanations have been suggested. For
example, a rival hypothesis is that other-
mind thought creates stress, which inhibits
thinking in those terms (see Rieffe et al.,
2000). On this view there is no cogni-
tive shortfall as there is on the mind-
blindness hypothesis; instead other-mind
thinking is disrupted by stress. It has even
been suggested that autism is not a uni-
tary condition, in which case there is
no single explanation to be had (Happe
et al., 2006). Nevertheless, whatever the
explanation, those with autism systemati-
cally do worse in similar circumstances in
attributing emotion states to other minds.
Few doubt that those with autism have a
problem with attributing mental states to
others. That remains relatively uncontro-
versial and a consensus view. [There are
dissenting voices: see for example Tracy
et al. (2011). But the results cited in that
paper only concern a highly structured
task and are not generalizeable. Compare
Allen et al. (2013).]
Despite divergences, most current the-
ories of autism agree that autistic people
are less well-functioning, not in their pos-
session of emotions but (A) in the abil-
ity to attribute emotions to others, (B)
in the ability to imagine emotions when
not having them, and (C) in their abil-
ity to describe emotions in language. On
this last point, 85% of those who are inde-
pendently identified as having autism have
what is called “Alexithymia II,” which is a
shortfall in the ability to name their own
emotions (Hill et al., 2004). Alexithymia II
indicates a defect in understanding one’s
own emotions. These shortfalls have been
probed and the difference between autistic
groups and non-autistic groups in ascrib-
ing, imagining and describing emotion
is statistically significant, and the results
replicated [Hobson, 1993; Frith, 2003; see
also Bird et al. (2010) for the view that the
defect in self-knowledge explains defects
in thinking about other minds]. There
are a variety of theories of what autism
is, what explains it, and of exactly what
abilities such a person has or lacks. But
most psychologists accept that in general
and in similar circumstances, the psycho-
logical ascriptions by those with autism
are less accurate than those of typically
developing people, and that, whatever the
ultimate explanation, thinking in terms of
the mental states of others is more difficult
for those with autism than for typically
developing people. This much remains
widely accepted.
Part of the shortfall of autistic people
with respect to the emotions of others is
that they find it hard to ascribe emotions
that they do not feel. That is, there is
a shortfall not only in respect of knowl-
edge but also in respect of imagination.
The well-known false-belief puppet tests
show that autistic people do worse at
conceiving of others as having beliefs
and other mental states that they them-
selves lack (Baron-Cohen, 1995). And this
derives from differences in the ability
to imagine mental states they lack. The
interpretation of our general ability to
think about other minds is controversial
(there was once a “simulation vs. theory-
theory” debate). But all sides agree that
understanding other minds implies being
able to conceive or imagine other peo-
ple having states that the ascriber lacks.
(Imagination in this sense does not neces-
sarily mean imagining what is not the case;
we may imagine what is now going on in
New Zealand.)
MUSICAL EXPERIENCE AND AUTISM
With these general remarks about autism
on the table, let us now turn to music.
One question is: what is the autistic per-
son’s experience of music like? Perhaps
a better question is a comparative one:
how, if at all, do the autistic and non-
autistic person’s experiences of music dif-
fer? We need a relatively neutral empirical
investigation of this. We need data com-
paring autistic and non-autistic musical
experience.
The use of questionnaires is obviously
inappropriate for studying the musical
experiences of autistic people. For they
are less able than non-autistic people in
applying linguistic emotion descriptions
to themselves (Alexithymia II). We need
access to musical experience, apart from
self-reports.
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One way forward is to use physiologi-
cal responses to music as evidence. This is
what Rory Allen and his collaborators have
pursued in a number of papers. He used
galvanic skin responses (“GSR”), which are
generally accepted as a non-verbal mea-
sure of general physiological arousal, as a
non-verbal measure of people’s response
tomusic (Allen et al., 2013). “Physiological
arousal,” in this sense, does not necessar-
ily indicate ordinary (non-musical) emo-
tions of the anger, grief, pride variety.
Many ordinary emotions involve physio-
logical arousal, and they are accompanied
by GSR, but there can be physiological
arousal without ordinary emotions. That
is, ordinary emotions generate GSR but
GSR does not necessarily indicate ordinary
emotions.
The suggestion is that we may take the
GSR tests to measure what we may call
“musical experience,” in a general and neu-
tral sense. This is an extra assumption.
But we may accept it, given the partic-
ular experimental context in which GSR
occurred. In the experimental situation the
response occurred given the music prompt
and not without it. Random non-musical
noise did not produce the response. So this
makes it very likely that the response is
to the music, in the sense that not only
is it caused by the music but it indi-
cates a psychological state that is about the
music—the content of which is the music.
Furthermore, although GSR arousal can
reflect positive or negative arousal, there
is no reason not to assume the responses
to be a positive rather than negative—
although for the argument of this paper,
it does not matter whether the response is
positive or negative so long as it indicates
musical experience. GSR signals musical
experience and the lack of GSR (in those
experimental circumstances) signals lack
of musical experience. Saying that musical
experience is indicated by GSR is neutral
in itself about the nature of those expe-
rience, which is exactly why they can be
used as part of an argument for their
nature.
Hence, other things being equal, in
most cases, and in the experimental situ-
ation in which musical stimulus was pro-
vided, GSR indicates musical experience,
which in most cases can be assumed to be
a positive felt response of some kind or
other. The question is: what kind?
THE RESULTS AND THE ARGUMENT TO
MUSICAL EXPERIENCE IN GENERAL
Allen and associates compared the phys-
iological responses of autistic and non-
autistic musical listeners. Participants in
the experiment listened to a standard set
of musical stimuli, and their physiologi-
cal reactions were compared with a con-
trol set of environmental noise stimuli,
so as to filter out responses to sound as
such, rather than to music. (The music
was of a sort familiar to both groups of
listeners.)
What were the results?
What Allen and associates found was
that autistic listeners do respond physio-
logically to music, and—and this is the
very interesting result—they respond to a
similar degree to typical non-autistic lis-
teners. That is, the result was: there was no
significant difference between autistic and
non-autistic control groups. They wrote:
“The results indicated that there was no
sign of any reduced responsiveness to
the musical stimuli, at this physiological
level, in the ASC group compared with
the control group.” (Allen et al., 2013, p.
440.)
Autistic listener’s felt responses to music is
(statistically) normal. Of course there are
a diversity of autism phenomena. But in
what are called “high-functioning” cases
of autism, the musical response, as mea-
sured by GSR, was not significantly differ-
ent from the non-autistic control group.
[For some similar results see also Heaton
et al. (2001) and Heaton (2009). Khalfa
and Peretz (2007) report enhanced GSR
responsiveness in autistic listeners; if that
were correct it would strengthen the argu-
ment.]
Now what do these results about physi-
ological arousal result tell us? Physiological
arousal is indicative of music experience,
whatever it is. Music experience might
be a variety of kinds of mental states,
such as sensation, emotion, imagination,
belief. It does not matter for our purposes.
What is important is that physiological
arousal is consequential on music experi-
ence, whatever it is, and the interesting fact
is that it is statistically normal for autistic
listeners.
The GSR response, in itself, is neutral
concerning the nature of the musical
response (the state of mind of musical
experience)—whether it is an ordinary
emotion, such as grief, pride or anger, or
the idea that it is a specifically musical
emotion, or the idea that it is a pleasure
in the beauty of the music. GSR would
measure all this.
However, the GSR results, when com-
bined with general facts about autism, give
us a strong argument, which is this:
1. Autistic and non-autistic groups dif-
fer with respect to understanding and
imagining emotion.
2. But they do not differ in the physiolog-
ical arousal that is indicative of musical
experience.
3. So whatever the musical experience is,
it should not be understood in terms of
understanding or imagining emotions.
4. If it were, autistic and non-autistic lis-
teners would be significantly different.
But the GSR results show that they
are not.
There are merely logically possible
hypotheses that this argument ignores.
One is that music uniquely triggers nor-
mal emotion cognition in autistic listeners.
But there is too much independent evi-
dence for a general capacity shortfall
to make musical listening somehow an
exceptional miraculous cure for autism.
Autistic people have emotions but the
independent evidence for Alexithymia
II) among most of those with autism is
strong. Another logically possible idea
would be that autistic listeners are indeed
responding positively and they are lis-
tening to the same sounds, but they are
somehow listening to the sound but not
as music. However, the noise control ruled
out the response being to noise. Are they
responding only to rhythm, say? There is
no more reason to think this than there
is to think that red-haired people listen
to music differently. Given that we do not
have to worry about such bare possibil-
ities, we can make a strong inference to
the best explanation to the effect that the
musical experiences of both autistic and
control group listeners involves neither
understanding nor imagining emotion.
Two comments:
(A) The position defended here fits neatly
with the prevalence and effectiveness
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of music therapy on people with
autism. It is effective with autis-
tic people precisely because they do
not have to think in terms of psy-
chological states. That is why music
works well with them. (I gather that
something parallel is true of visual
designs and rhythms, as opposed to
representations of people expressing
psychological states.)
(B) The view also fits neatly with the fact
that there are gifted autistic musi-
cians. Presumably musical experience
is a constituent part of what is nec-
essary for musical performance. If
so, according to the emotion theories
of music that I am targeting, there
should be no gifted autistic musicians.
But there are. (These musicians tend
to be soloists rather than orchestral
and chamber group players Miller,
1989).
CODA
The argument is this. Physiological
responses show that the music experiences
of autistic people are normal in
comparison with the musical expe-
riences of non-autistic people. But
their emotion understanding, imagina-
tion and description is not. Therefore,
both autistic and non-autistic musical
experience is independent of their emo-
tion understanding, imagination, and
description.
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